# dumping to a file named ' ' so that the ssh-keygen output
# doesn't claim any potentially bogus hostname(s):
- tmpkey=$(mktemp -d ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX)
- gpg_authentication "--export $fingerprint" | openpgp2ssh "$fingerprint" 2>/dev/null > "$tmpkey/ "
+ tmpkey=$(mktemp ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX) || failure "Could not create temporary directory!"
+ gpg_authentication "--export $fingerprint" | openpgp2ssh "$fingerprint" 2>/dev/null > "$tmpkey"
echo -n "ssh fingerprint: "
- (cd "$tmpkey" && ssh-keygen -l -f ' ' | awk '{ print $2 }')
+ ssh-keygen -l -f $tmpkey | awk '{ print $1, $2, $4 }'
rm -rf "$tmpkey"
echo -n "OpenPGP fingerprint: "
echo "$fingerprint"
unames=$(getent passwd | cut -d: -f1)
fi
+ RETCODE=0
+
# set mode
MODE="authorized_keys"
# loop over users
for uname in $unames ; do
# check all specified users exist
- if ! getent passwd "$uname" >/dev/null ; then
+ if ! id "$uname" >/dev/null ; then
log error "----- unknown user '$uname' -----"
continue
fi
log verbose "----- user: $uname -----"
# make temporary directory
- TMPLOC=$(mktemp -d ${MSTMPDIR}/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX)
+ TMPLOC=$(mktemp -d ${MSTMPDIR}/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX) || failure "Could not create temporary directory!"
# trap to delete temporary directory on exit
trap "rm -rf $TMPLOC" EXIT
# add user-controlled authorized_keys file if specified
# translate ssh-style path variables
rawAuthorizedKeys=$(translate_ssh_variables "$uname" "$RAW_AUTHORIZED_KEYS")
- if [ "$rawAuthorizedKeys" ] ; then
+ if [ "$rawAuthorizedKeys" != 'none' ] ; then
log debug "checking for raw authorized_keys..."
if [ -s "$rawAuthorizedKeys" ] ; then
# check permissions on the authorized_keys file path
# openssh appears to check the contents of the
# authorized_keys file as the user in question, so the
# file must be readable by that user at least.
- # FIXME: is there a better way to do this?
- chown $(whoami) "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS"
- chgrp $(getent passwd "$uname" | cut -f4 -d:) "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS"
- chmod g+r "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS"
- mv -f "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" "${SYSDATADIR}/authorized_keys/${uname}"
+ # but in general, we don't want the user tampering with
+ # this file directly, so we'll adopt this approach: Own
+ # the file by the monkeysphere-server invoker (usually
+ # root, but should be the same uid that sshd is launched
+ # as); change the group of the file so that members of the
+ # user's group can read it.
+
+ # FIXME: is there a better way to do this?
+ chown $(whoami) "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" && \
+ chgrp $(id -g "$uname") "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" && \
+ chmod g+r "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" && \
+ mv -f "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" "${SYSDATADIR}/authorized_keys/${uname}" || \
+ {
+ log error "Failed to install authorized_keys for '$uname'!"
+ rm -f "${SYSDATADIR}/authorized_keys/${uname}"
+ # indicate that there has been a failure:
+ RETURN=1
+ }
else
rm -f "${SYSDATADIR}/authorized_keys/${uname}"
fi