X-Git-Url: https://codewiz.org/gitweb?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fkeytrans%2Fpem2openpgp;h=94fd3c89de16fdba5bb427b861b89b54ac9d36a9;hb=21062dd622620dd44001858bd9cb4116ac978529;hp=e76ba6f81e36c02db87426262d1450fda5b9d867;hpb=efb99a4677ec05fb481e50bbb739f066c4025d25;p=monkeysphere.git diff --git a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp index e76ba6f..94fd3c8 100755 --- a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp +++ b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp @@ -1,8 +1,12 @@ #!/usr/bin/perl -w -T # pem2openpgp: take a PEM-encoded RSA private-key on standard input, a -# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP certificate -# from it. +# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP secret key +# and certificate from it. + +# WARNING: the secret key material *will* appear on stdout (albeit in +# OpenPGP form) -- if you redirect stdout to a file, make sure the +# permissions on that file are appropriately locked down! # Usage: @@ -19,112 +23,37 @@ use strict; use warnings; +use File::Basename; use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA; use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum; +use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX; use Digest::SHA1; use MIME::Base64; ## make sure all length() and substr() calls use bytes only: use bytes; -my $uid = shift; - -# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to -# hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ? - -# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body. -# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2) -sub make_packet { - my $type = shift; - my $body = shift; - - my $len = length($body); - - my $lenbytes; - my $lencode; - - if ($len < 2**8) { - $lenbytes = 0; - $lencode = 'C'; - } elsif ($len < 2**16) { - $lenbytes = 1; - $lencode = 'n'; - } elsif ($len < 2**31) { - ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal - ## with potential overflow. - $lenbytes = 2; - $lencode = 'N'; - } else { - ## what the hell do we do here? - $lenbytes = 3; - $lencode = ''; - } - - return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len). - $body; -} - - -# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI -# (RFC 4880 section 3.2) -sub mpi_pack { - my $num = shift; - - my $val = $num->to_bin(); - my $mpilen = length($val)*8; - -# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the -# first byte: - my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val))); - - $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte); - - return pack('n', $mpilen).$val; -} - -# FIXME: genericize this to accept either RSA or DSA keys: -sub make_rsa_pub_key_body { - my $key = shift; - my $timestamp = shift; - - my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters(); - - return - pack('CN', 4, $timestamp). - pack('C', 1). # RSA - mpi_pack($n). - mpi_pack($e); - -} - -# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp -sub fingerprint { - my $key = shift; - my $timestamp = shift; - - my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp); - - return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody); -} - -# FIXME: replace the opaque numbers below with -# semantically-meaningful references based on these tables. +my $old_format_packet_lengths = { one => 0, + two => 1, + four => 2, + indeterminate => 3, +}; # see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now) my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1, elgamal => 16, dsa => 17, - } + }; # see RFC 4880 section 9.2 my $ciphers = { plaintext => 0, idea => 1, - 3des => 2, + tripledes => 2, cast5 => 3, blowfish => 4, aes128 => 7, aes192 => 8, - aes256 => 9 + aes256 => 9, twofish => 10, }; @@ -156,7 +85,6 @@ my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01, shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key }; - # see RFC 4880 section 4.3 my $packet_types = { pubkey_enc_session => 1, sig => 2, @@ -197,153 +125,504 @@ my $sig_types = { binary_doc => 0x00, # see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.1 -my $subpacket_types => { sig_creation_time => 2, - sig_expiration_time => 3, - exportable => 4, - trust_sig => 5, - regex => 6, - revocable => 7, - key_expiration_time => 9, - preferred_cipher => 11, - revocation_key => 12, - issuer => 16, - notation => 20, - preferred_digest => 21, - keyserver_prefs => 23, - preferred_keyserver => 24, - primary_uid => 25, - policy_uri => 26, - usage_flags => 27, - signers_uid => 28, - revocation_reason => 29, - features => 30, - signature_target => 31, - embedded_signature = 32, +my $subpacket_types = { sig_creation_time => 2, + sig_expiration_time => 3, + exportable => 4, + trust_sig => 5, + regex => 6, + revocable => 7, + key_expiration_time => 9, + preferred_cipher => 11, + revocation_key => 12, + issuer => 16, + notation => 20, + preferred_digest => 21, + preferred_compression => 22, + keyserver_prefs => 23, + preferred_keyserver => 24, + primary_uid => 25, + policy_uri => 26, + usage_flags => 27, + signers_uid => 28, + revocation_reason => 29, + features => 30, + signature_target => 31, + embedded_signature => 32, }; -# we're just not dealing with newline business right now. slurp in -# the whole file. -undef $/; -my $buf = ; +# bitstring (see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.24) +my $features = { mdc => 0x01 + }; + +# bitstring (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.17) +my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80 + }; + +###### end lookup tables ###### + +# FIXME: if we want to be able to interpret openpgp data as well as +# produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well. -my $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($buf); +########### Math/Utility Functions ############## -$rsa->use_sha1_hash(); -$rsa->use_no_padding(); -if (! $rsa->check_key()) { - die "key does not check"; +# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880 +sub simple_checksum { + my $bytes = shift; + + return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536; } -my $version = pack('C', 4); -# strong assertion of identity: -my $sigtype = pack('C', 0x13); -# RSA -my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', 1); -# SHA1 -my $hash_algo = pack('C', 2); +# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's +# extended algorithm. For more information see: +# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the +# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects. $a should +# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be +# coprime. -# FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP -# certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run -# this script more than once against the same key. How can we prevent -# this? +sub modular_multi_inverse { + my $a = shift; + my $b = shift; -# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time? -my $timestamp = time(); -my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, 2, $timestamp); + my $origdivisor = $b->copy(); + my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new(); + my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero(); + my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one(); + my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one(); + my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero(); -# FIXME: HARDCODED: what if someone wants to select a different set of -# usage flags? For now, we do only authentication. -my $flags = $usage_flags->{authenticate}; -my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, 27, $flags); + my $finalquotient; + my $finalremainder; + while (! $b->is_zero()) { + my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx); -# FIXME: HARDCODED: how should we determine how far off to set the -# expiration date? default is to expire in 2 days, which is insanely -# short (but good for testing). -my $expires_in = 86400*2; -my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, 9, $expires_in); + $a = $b; + $b = $remainder; + my $temp = $x; + $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx)); + $lastx = $temp; -# prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES: -my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, 11, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2); + $temp = $y; + $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx)); + $lasty = $temp; + } -# prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160 -my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, 21, 2, 8, 3); + if (!$a->is_one()) { + die "did this math wrong.\n"; + } -# prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP -my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, 22, 2, 3, 1); + # let's make sure that we return a positive value because RFC 4880, + # section 3.2 only allows unsigned values: -# we support the MDC feature: -my $features = pack('CCC', 2, 30, 1); + ($finalquotient, $finalremainder) = $lastx->add($origdivisor)->div($origdivisor, $ctx); -# keyserver preference: only owner modify (???): -my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, 23, 0x80); + return $finalremainder; +} -my $subpackets_to_be_hashed = - $creation_time_packet. - $usage_packet. - $expiration_packet. - $pref_sym_algos. - $pref_hash_algos. - $pref_zip_algos. - $features. - $keyserver_pref; -my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed)); +############ OpenPGP formatting functions ############ -my $sig_data_to_be_hashed = - $version. - $sigtype. - $pubkey_algo. - $hash_algo. - $subpacket_octets. - $subpackets_to_be_hashed; +# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body. +# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2) +sub make_packet { + my $type = shift; + my $body = shift; + my $options = shift; -my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp); + my $len = length($body); + my $pseudolen = $len; -#open(KEYFILE, "{'packet_length'}) { + $pseudolen = 2**($options->{'packet_length'} * 8) - 1; + } + if ($pseudolen < $len) { + $pseudolen = $len; + } -# take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid: -my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8); + my $lenbytes; + my $lencode; -# the v4 signature trailer is: + if ($pseudolen < 2**8) { + $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{one}; + $lencode = 'C'; + } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**16) { + $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{two}; + $lencode = 'n'; + } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**31) { + ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal + ## with potential overflow. + $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{four}; + $lencode = 'N'; + } else { + ## what the hell do we do here? + $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{indeterminate}; + $lencode = ''; + } -# version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the -# signature data itself. -my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed)); + return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len). + $body; +} -my $uid_data = - pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)). - $uid; -my $datatosign = - $key_data. - $uid_data. - $sig_data_to_be_hashed. - $trailer; +# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI +# (RFC 4880 section 3.2) +sub mpi_pack { + my $num = shift; -my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign); + my $val = $num->to_bin(); + my $mpilen = length($val)*8; +# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the +# first byte: + my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val))); -my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, 16, $keyid); + $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte); -my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign)); + return pack('n', $mpilen).$val; +} -my $sig_body = - $sig_data_to_be_hashed. - pack('n', length($issuer_packet)). - $issuer_packet. - pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))). - mpi_pack($sig); +# FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys: +sub make_rsa_pub_key_body { + my $key = shift; + my $timestamp = shift; + + my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters(); + + return + pack('CN', 4, $timestamp). + pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}). + mpi_pack($n). + mpi_pack($e); +} + +sub make_rsa_sec_key_body { + my $key = shift; + my $timestamp = shift; + + # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c. + my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters(); -print - make_packet(6, $pubkey). - make_packet(13, $uid). - make_packet(2, $sig_body); + my $c3 = modular_multi_inverse($p, $q); + my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d). + mpi_pack($p). + mpi_pack($q). + mpi_pack($c3); + + # according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, the closest value we can get out + # of get_key_parameters is 1/q mod p; but according to sec 5.5.3 of + # RFC 4880, we're actually looking for u, the multiplicative inverse + # of p, mod q. This is why we're calculating the value directly + # with modular_multi_inverse. + + return + pack('CN', 4, $timestamp). + pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}). + mpi_pack($n). + mpi_pack($e). + pack('C', 0). # seckey material is not encrypted -- see RFC 4880 sec 5.5.3 + $secret_material. + pack('n', simple_checksum($secret_material)); +} + +# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp +sub fingerprint { + my $key = shift; + my $timestamp = shift; + + my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp); + + return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody); +} + + +# FIXME: handle DSA keys as well! +sub pem2openpgp { + my $rsa = shift; + my $uid = shift; + my $args = shift; + + $rsa->use_sha1_hash(); + + # see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding + # choice to use: + $rsa->use_pkcs1_padding(); + + if (! $rsa->check_key()) { + die "key does not check"; + } + + my $version = pack('C', 4); + # strong assertion of identity: + my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification}); + # RSA + my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}); + # SHA1 + my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1}); + + # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP + # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run + # this script more than once against the same key (because the + # timestamps will differ). How can we prevent this? + + # this environment variable (if set) overrides the current time, to + # be able to create a standard key? If we read the key from a file + # instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file? + my $timestamp = 0; + if (defined $args->{timestamp}) { + $timestamp = ($args->{timestamp} + 0); + } else { + $timestamp = time(); + } + + my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp); + + + my $flags = 0; + if (! defined $args->{usage_flags}) { + $flags = $usage_flags->{certify}; + } else { + my @ff = split(",", $args->{usage_flags}); + foreach my $f (@ff) { + if (! defined $usage_flags->{$f}) { + die "No such flag $f"; + } + $flags |= $usage_flags->{$f}; + } + } + + my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $flags); + + + # how should we determine how far off to set the expiration date? + # default is no expiration. Specify the timestamp in seconds from the + # key creation. + my $expiration_packet = ''; + if (defined $args->{expiration}) { + my $expires_in = $args->{expiration} + 0; + $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in); + } + + + # prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES: + my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher}, + $ciphers->{aes256}, + $ciphers->{aes192}, + $ciphers->{aes128}, + $ciphers->{cast5}, + $ciphers->{tripledes} + ); + + # prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160 + my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest}, + $digests->{sha1}, + $digests->{sha256}, + $digests->{ripemd160} + ); + + # prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP + my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression}, + $zips->{zlib}, + $zips->{bzip2}, + $zips->{zip} + ); + + # we support the MDC feature: + my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features}, + $features->{mdc}); + + # keyserver preference: only owner modify (???): + my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs}, + $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify}); + + my $subpackets_to_be_hashed = + $creation_time_packet. + $usage_packet. + $expiration_packet. + $pref_sym_algos. + $pref_hash_algos. + $pref_zip_algos. + $feature_subpacket. + $keyserver_pref; + + my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed)); + + my $sig_data_to_be_hashed = + $version. + $sigtype. + $pubkey_algo. + $hash_algo. + $subpacket_octets. + $subpackets_to_be_hashed; + + my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp); + my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp); + + # this is for signing. it needs to be an old-style header with a + # 2-packet octet count. + + my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey, {'packet_length'=>2}); + + # take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid: + my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8); + + # the v4 signature trailer is: + + # version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the + # signature data itself. + my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed)); + + my $uid_data = + pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)). + $uid; + + my $datatosign = + $key_data. + $uid_data. + $sig_data_to_be_hashed. + $trailer; + + my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign); + + my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid); + + my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign)); + + my $sig_body = + $sig_data_to_be_hashed. + pack('n', length($issuer_packet)). + $issuer_packet. + pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))). + mpi_pack($sig); + + return + make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey). + make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid). + make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body); +} + + + + +sub openpgp2ssh { + my $instr = shift; + my $fpr = shift; + + my $packettag; + my $dummy; + my $tag; + + while (! eof($instr)) { + read($instr, $packettag, 1); + $packettag = ord($packettag); + + my $packetlen; + if ( ! (0x80 & $packettag)) { + die "This is not an OpenPGP packet\n"; + } + if (0x40 & $packettag) { + print STDERR "This is a new-style packet header\n"; + $tag = (0x3f & $packettag); + my $nextlen = 0; + read($instr, $nextlen, 1); + $nextlen = ord($nextlen); + if ($nextlen < 192) { + $packetlen = $nextlen; + } elsif ($nextlen < 224) { + my $newoct; + read($instr, $newoct, 1); + $newoct = ord($newoct); + $packetlen = (($nextlen - 192) << 8) + ($newoct) + 192; + } elsif ($nextlen == 255) { + read($instr, $nextlen, 4); + $packetlen = unpack('%L', $nextlen); + } else { + # packet length is undefined. + } + } else { + my $lentype; + print STDERR "This is an old-style packet header\n"; + $lentype = 0x03 & $packettag; + $tag = ( 0x3c & $packettag ) >> 2; + if ($lentype == 0) { + read($instr, $packetlen, 1) or die "could not read packet length\n"; + $packetlen = unpack('C', $packetlen); + } elsif ($lentype == 1) { + read($instr, $packetlen, 2) or die "could not read packet length\n"; + $packetlen = unpack('n', $packetlen); + } elsif ($lentype == 2) { + read($instr, $packetlen, 4) or die "could not read packet length\n"; + $packetlen = unpack('N', $packetlen); + } else { + # packet length is undefined. + } + } + + if (! defined($packetlen)) { + die "Undefined packet lengths are not supported.\n"; + } + printf(STDERR "Packet is %d long\n", $packetlen); + + if ($tag == $packet_types->{pubkey} || + $tag == $packet_types->{pub_subkey} || + $tag == $packet_types->{seckey} || + $tag == $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) { + printf(STDERR "Packet type %d\n", $tag); + read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen) or die "Could not seek!\n"; + } else { + printf(STDERR "We do not care about this packet.\n"); + read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen) or die "Could not seek!\n"; + } + } + + print $tag; +} + + +for (basename($0)) { + if (/^pem2openpgp$/) { + my $rsa; + my $stdin; + if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY}) { + $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key($ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY}); + } else { + $stdin = do { + local $/; # slurp! + ; + }; + + $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($stdin); + } + + my $uid = shift; + + # FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to + # hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ? + + print pem2openpgp($rsa, + $uid, + { timestamp => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP}, + expiration => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_EXPIRATION}, + usage_flags => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS}, + } + ); + } + elsif (/^openpgp2ssh$/) { + my $fpr = shift; + my $instream; + open($instream,'-'); + binmode($instream, ":bytes"); + openpgp2ssh($instream, $fpr); + } + else { + die "Unrecognized keytrans call.\n"; + } +}