X-Git-Url: https://codewiz.org/gitweb?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fshare%2Fkeytrans;h=171a1f64a910c0035ebea864fded44bbbf840b42;hb=d0116abc28011849b0de688200b8782d24088021;hp=c47ccdc792d6cdfd98cf6fdb591ee9dae13e3969;hpb=2be12861abfe70143aada51e9034a218967658bf;p=monkeysphere.git

diff --git a/src/share/keytrans b/src/share/keytrans
index c47ccdc..171a1f6 100755
--- a/src/share/keytrans
+++ b/src/share/keytrans
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ use File::Basename;
 use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
 use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum;
 use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX;
-use Digest::SHA1;
+use Digest::SHA;
 use MIME::Base64;
 use POSIX;
 
@@ -368,12 +368,12 @@ sub read_mpi {
 # FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
 sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
   my $key = shift;
-  my $timestamp = shift;
+  my $key_timestamp = shift;
 
   my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters();
 
   return
-    pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+    pack('CN', 4, $key_timestamp).
       pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
 	mpi_pack($n).
 	  mpi_pack($e);
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
 
 sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
   my $key = shift;
-  my $timestamp = shift;
+  my $key_timestamp = shift;
 
   # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
   my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters();
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
   # with modular_multi_inverse.
 
   return
-    pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+    pack('CN', 4, $key_timestamp).
       pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
 	mpi_pack($n).
 	  mpi_pack($e).
@@ -412,11 +412,11 @@ sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
 # expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
 sub fingerprint {
   my $key = shift;
-  my $timestamp = shift;
+  my $key_timestamp = shift;
 
-  my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
+  my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $key_timestamp);
 
-  return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
+  return Digest::SHA::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
 }
 
 
@@ -426,42 +426,22 @@ sub pem2openpgp {
   my $uid = shift;
   my $args = shift;
 
-  $rsa->use_sha256_hash();
-
-  # see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
-  # choice to use:
-  $rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
-
-  if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
-    die "key does not check";
+  # strong assertion of identity is the default (for a self-sig):
+  if (! defined $args->{certification_type}) {
+    $args->{certification_type} = $sig_types->{positive_certification};
   }
 
-  my $version = pack('C', 4);
-  # strong assertion of identity:
-  my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
-  # RSA
-  my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
-  # SHA1
-  my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha256});
-
-  # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
-  # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
-  # this script more than once against the same key (because the
-  # timestamps will differ).  How can we prevent this?
-
-  # this environment variable (if set) overrides the current time, to
-  # be able to create a standard key?  If we read the key from a file
-  # instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
-  my $timestamp = 0;
-  if (defined $args->{timestamp}) {
-    $timestamp = ($args->{timestamp} + 0);
-  } else {
-    $timestamp = time();
+  if (! defined $args->{sig_timestamp}) {
+    $args->{sig_timestamp} = time();
   }
+  if (! defined $args->{key_timestamp}) {
+    $args->{key_timestamp} = $args->{sig_timestamp} + 0;
+  }
+  my $key_timestamp = $args->{key_timestamp};
 
-  my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
-
+  # generate and aggregate subpackets:
 
+  # key usage flags:
   my $flags = 0;
   if (! defined $args->{usage_flags}) {
     $flags = $usage_flags->{certify};
@@ -474,17 +454,15 @@ sub pem2openpgp {
       $flags |= $usage_flags->{$f};
     }
   }
-
-  my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $flags);
-
+  my $usage_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $flags);
 
   # how should we determine how far off to set the expiration date?
   # default is no expiration.  Specify the timestamp in seconds from the
   # key creation.
-  my $expiration_packet = '';
+  my $expiration_subpacket = '';
   if (defined $args->{expiration}) {
     my $expires_in = $args->{expiration} + 0;
-    $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
+    $expiration_subpacket = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
   }
 
 
@@ -522,17 +500,71 @@ sub pem2openpgp {
   my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
 			    $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
 
-  my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
-    $creation_time_packet.
-      $usage_packet.
-	$expiration_packet.
+
+  $args->{hashed_subpackets} =
+      $usage_subpacket.
+	$expiration_subpacket.
 	  $pref_sym_algos.
 	    $pref_hash_algos.
 	      $pref_zip_algos.
 		$feature_subpacket.
 		  $keyserver_pref;
 
-  my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
+  return
+    make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $key_timestamp)).
+      make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
+	gensig($rsa, $uid, $args);
+}
+
+# FIXME: handle non-RSA keys
+
+# FIXME: this currently only makes self-sigs -- we should parameterize
+# it to make certifications over keys other than the issuer.
+sub gensig {
+  my $rsa = shift;
+  my $uid = shift;
+  my $args = shift;
+
+  # FIXME: allow signature creation using digests other than SHA256
+  $rsa->use_sha256_hash();
+
+  # see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
+  # choice to use:
+  $rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
+
+  if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
+    die "key does not check";
+  }
+
+  my $certtype = $args->{certification_type} + 0;
+
+  my $version = pack('C', 4);
+  my $sigtype = pack('C', $certtype);
+  # RSA
+  my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
+  # SHA256 FIXME: allow signature creation using digests other than SHA256
+  my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha256});
+
+  # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
+  # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
+  # this script more than once against the same key (because the
+  # timestamps will differ).  How can we prevent this?
+
+  # this argument (if set) overrides the current time, to
+  # be able to create a standard key.  If we read the key from a file
+  # instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
+  my $sig_timestamp = ($args->{sig_timestamp} + 0);
+  my $key_timestamp = ($args->{key_timestamp} + 0);
+
+  if ($key_timestamp > $sig_timestamp) {
+    die "key timestamp must not be later than signature timestamp";
+  }
+
+  my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $sig_timestamp);
+
+  my $hashed_subs = $creation_time_packet.$args->{hashed_subpackets};
+
+  my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($hashed_subs));
 
   my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
     $version.
@@ -540,10 +572,9 @@ sub pem2openpgp {
 	$pubkey_algo.
 	  $hash_algo.
 	    $subpacket_octets.
-	      $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
+	      $hashed_subs;
 
-  my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
-  my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+  my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $key_timestamp);
 
   # this is for signing.  it needs to be an old-style header with a
   # 2-packet octet count.
@@ -551,7 +582,7 @@ sub pem2openpgp {
   my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey, {'packet_length'=>2});
 
   # take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
-  my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
+  my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $key_timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
 
   # the v4 signature trailer is:
 
@@ -569,7 +600,9 @@ sub pem2openpgp {
 	$sig_data_to_be_hashed.
 	  $trailer;
 
-  my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
+
+  # FIXME: handle signatures over digests other than SHA256:
+  my $data_hash = Digest::SHA::sha256_hex($datatosign);
 
   my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
 
@@ -582,14 +615,198 @@ sub pem2openpgp {
 	  pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
 	    mpi_pack($sig);
 
-  return
-    make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
-      make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
-	make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
+  return make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
+}
+
+# FIXME: switch to passing the whole packet as the arg, instead of the
+# input stream.
+
+# FIXME: think about native perl representation of the packets instead.
+
+# Put a user ID into the $data
+sub finduid {
+  my $data = shift;
+  my $instr = shift;
+  my $tag = shift;
+  my $packetlen = shift;
+
+  my $dummy;
+  ($tag == $packet_types->{uid}) or die "This should not be called on anything but a User ID packet";
+
+  read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen);
+  $data->{uid} = {} unless defined $data->{uid};
+  $data->{uid}->{$dummy} = {};
+}
+
+
+# find signatures associated with the given fingerprint and user ID.
+sub findsig {
+  my $data = shift;
+  my $instr = shift;
+  my $tag = shift;
+  my $packetlen = shift;
+
+  ($tag == $packet_types->{sig}) or die "No calling findsig on anything other than a signature packet.";
+
+  my $dummy;
+  my $readbytes = 0;
+
+  if ((undef $data->{key}) ||
+      (undef $data->{uid}) ||
+      (undef $data->{uid}->{$data->{target}->{uid}})) {
+    # this is not the user ID we are looking for.
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+  }
+
+  read($instr, $data, 6) or die "could not read signature header\n";
+  my ($ver, $sigtype, $pubkeyalgo, $digestalgo, $subpacketsize) = unpack('CCCCn', $data);
+  if ($ver != 4) {
+    printf(STDERR "We only work with version 4 signatures.");
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    return;
+  }
+  if ($pubkeyalgo != $asym_algos->{rsa}) {
+    printf(STDERR "We can only work with RSA at the moment");
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    return;
+  }
+  if ($sigtype != $sig_types->{positive_certification}) {
+    # FIXME: some weird implementations might have made generic,
+    # persona, or casual certifications instead of positive
+    # certifications for self-sigs.  Probably should handle them too.
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    return;
+  }
+
+  my $subpackets;
+  read($instr, $subpackets, $subpacketsize) or die "could not read hashed signature subpackets.\n";
+
+  read($instr, $subpacketsize, 2) or die "could not read unhashed signature subpacket size.\n";
+  $subpacketsize = unpack('n', $subpacketsize);
+
+  my $unhashedsubpackets;
+  read($instr, $unhashedsubpackets, $subpacketsize) or die "could not read unhashed signature subpackets.\n";
+
+  my $hashtail;
+  read($instr, $hashtail, 2) or die "could not read left 16 bits of digest.\n";
+
+  # FIXME: RSA signatures should read in how many MPIs?
+
 }
 
+# given an input stream and data, store the found key in data and
+# consume the rest of the stream corresponding to the packet.
+# data contains: (fpr: fingerprint to find, key: current best guess at key)
+sub findkey {
+  my $data = shift;
+  my $instr = shift;
+  my $tag = shift;
+  my $packetlen = shift;
+
+  my $dummy;
+  my $ver;
+  my $readbytes = 0;
+
+  read($instr, $ver, 1) or die "could not read key version\n";
+  $readbytes += 1;
+  $ver = ord($ver);
+
+  if ($ver != 4) {
+    printf(STDERR "We only work with version 4 keys.  This key appears to be version %s.\n", $ver);
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    return;
+  }
+
+  my $key_timestamp;
+  read($instr, $key_timestamp, 4) or die "could not read key timestamp.\n";
+  $readbytes += 4;
+  $key_timestamp = unpack('N', $key_timestamp);
+
+  my $algo;
+  read($instr, $algo, 1) or die "could not read key algorithm.\n";
+  $readbytes += 1;
+  $algo = ord($algo);
+  if ($algo != $asym_algos->{rsa}) {
+    printf(STDERR "We only support RSA keys (this key used algorithm %d).\n", $algo);
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    return;
+  }
+
+  ## we have an RSA key.
+  my $modulus = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+  my $exponent = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+
+  my $pubkey = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus, $exponent);
+  my $foundfpr = fingerprint($pubkey, $key_timestamp);
+
+  my $foundfprstr = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($foundfpr)->to_hex();
+  # left-pad with 0's to bring up to full 40-char (160-bit) fingerprint:
+  $foundfprstr = sprintf("%040s", $foundfprstr);
+
+  # is this a match?
+  if ((!defined($data->{target}->{fpr})) ||
+      (substr($foundfprstr, -1 * length($data->{target}->{fpr})) eq $data->{target}->{fpr})) {
+    if (defined($data->{key})) {
+      die "Found two matching keys.\n";
+    }
+    $data->{key} = { 'rsa' => $pubkey,
+		     'timestamp' => $key_timestamp };
+  }
+
+  if ($tag != $packet_types->{seckey} &&
+      $tag != $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) {
+    if ($readbytes < $packetlen) {
+      read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!defined($data->{key})) {
+    # we don't think the public part of this key matches
+    if ($readbytes < $packetlen) {
+      read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  my $s2k;
+  read($instr, $s2k, 1) or die "Could not read S2K octet.\n";
+  $readbytes += 1;
+  $s2k = ord($s2k);
+  if ($s2k != 0) {
+    printf(STDERR "We cannot handle encrypted secret keys.  Skipping!\n") ;
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+    return;
+  }
+
+  # secret material is unencrypted
+  # see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.3
+  my $d = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+  my $p = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+  my $q = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+  my $u = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+
+  my $checksum;
+  read($instr, $checksum, 2) or die "Could not read checksum of secret key material.\n";
+  $readbytes += 2;
+  $checksum = unpack('n', $checksum);
 
-sub openpgp2ssh {
+  # FIXME: compare with the checksum!  how?  the data is
+  # gone into the Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum
+
+  $data->{key}->{rsa} = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus,
+								     $exponent,
+								     $d,
+								     $p,
+								     $q);
+
+  $data->{key}->{rsa}->check_key() or die "Secret key is not a valid RSA key.\n";
+
+  if ($readbytes < $packetlen) {
+    read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+  }
+}
+
+sub openpgp2rsa {
   my $instr = shift;
   my $fpr = shift;
 
@@ -600,12 +817,69 @@ sub openpgp2ssh {
     $fpr = uc($fpr);
   }
 
+  my $data = { 'fpr' => $fpr};
+  my $subs = { $packet_types->{pubkey} => \&findkey,
+	       $packet_types->{pub_subkey} => \&findkey,
+	       $packet_types->{seckey} => \&findkey,
+	       $packet_types->{sec_subkey} => \&findkey };
+
+  packetwalk($instr, $subs, $data);
+
+  return $data->{key}->{rsa};
+}
+
+sub revokeuserid {
+  my $instr = shift;
+  my $fpr = shift;
+  my $uid = shift;
+
+  if ((! defined $fpr) ||
+      (length($fpr) < 8)) {
+    die "We need at least 8 hex digits of fingerprint.\n";
+  }
+
+  $fpr = uc($fpr);
+
+  if (! defined $uid) {
+    die "No User ID defined.\n";
+  }
+
+  my $data = { target => { fpr => $fpr,
+			 },
+	     };
+  my $subs = { $packet_types->{seckey} => \&findkey,
+	       $packet_types->{uid} => \&finduid
+	     };
+
+  packetwalk($instr, $subs, $data);
+
+  if ((! defined $data->{uid}) ||
+      (! defined $data->{uid}->{$uid})) {
+    die "The User ID \"$uid\" is not associated with this key";
+  }
+
+  if ((! defined $data->{key}) ||
+      (! defined $data->{key}->{rsa}) ||
+      (! defined $data->{key}->{timestamp})) {
+    die "The key requested was not found."
+  }
+
+  # what does a signature like this look like?
+
+  return 'abc';
+}
+
+
+
+sub packetwalk {
+  my $instr = shift;
+  my $subs = shift;
+  my $data = shift;
+
   my $packettag;
   my $dummy;
   my $tag;
 
-  my $key;
-
   while (! eof($instr)) {
     read($instr, $packettag, 1);
     $packettag = ord($packettag);
@@ -615,6 +889,7 @@ sub openpgp2ssh {
       die "This is not an OpenPGP packet\n";
     }
     if (0x40 & $packettag) {
+      # this is a new-format packet.
       $tag = (0x3f & $packettag);
       my $nextlen = 0;
       read($instr, $nextlen, 1);
@@ -633,6 +908,7 @@ sub openpgp2ssh {
 	# packet length is undefined.
       }
     } else {
+      # this is an old-format packet.
       my $lentype;
       $lentype = 0x03 & $packettag;
       $tag = ( 0x3c & $packettag ) >> 2;
@@ -654,102 +930,14 @@ sub openpgp2ssh {
       die "Undefined packet lengths are not supported.\n";
     }
 
-    if ($tag == $packet_types->{pubkey} ||
-	$tag == $packet_types->{pub_subkey} ||
-	$tag == $packet_types->{seckey} ||
-	$tag == $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) {
-      my $ver;
-      my $readbytes = 0;
-      read($instr, $ver, 1) or die "could not read key version\n";
-      $readbytes += 1;
-      $ver = ord($ver);
-
-      if ($ver != 4) {
-	printf(STDERR "We only work with version 4 keys.  This key appears to be version %s.\n", $ver);
-	read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
-      } else {
-
-	my $timestamp;
-	read($instr, $timestamp, 4) or die "could not read key timestamp.\n";
-	$readbytes += 4;
-	$timestamp = unpack('N', $timestamp);
-
-	my $algo;
-	read($instr, $algo, 1) or die "could not read key algorithm.\n";
-	$readbytes += 1;
-	$algo = ord($algo);
-	if ($algo != $asym_algos->{rsa}) {
-	  printf(STDERR "We only support RSA keys (this key used algorithm %d).\n", $algo);
-	  read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
-	} else {
-	  ## we have an RSA key.
-	  my $modulus = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
-	  my $exponent = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
-
-	  my $pubkey = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus, $exponent);
-	  my $foundfpr = fingerprint($pubkey, $timestamp);
-
-	  my $foundfprstr = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($foundfpr)->to_hex();
-	  # left-pad with 0's to bring up to full 40-char (160-bit) fingerprint:
-	  $foundfprstr = sprintf("%040s", $foundfprstr);
-
-	  # is this a match?
-	  if ((!defined($fpr)) ||
-	      (substr($foundfprstr, -1 * length($fpr)) eq $fpr)) {
-	    if (defined($key)) {
-	      die "Found two matching keys.\n";
-	    }
-	    $key = $pubkey;
-	  }
-
-	  if ($tag == $packet_types->{seckey} ||
-	      $tag == $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) {
-	    if (!defined($key)) { # we don't think the public part of
-                                  # this key matches
-	      read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
-	    } else {
-	      my $s2k;
-	      read($instr, $s2k, 1) or die "Could not read S2K octet.\n";
-	      $readbytes += 1;
-	      $s2k = ord($s2k);
-	      if ($s2k == 0) {
-		# secret material is unencrypted
-		# see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.3
-		my $d = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
-		my $p = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
-		my $q = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
-		my $u = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
-
-		my $checksum;
-		read($instr, $checksum, 2) or die "Could not read checksum of secret key material.\n";
-		$readbytes += 2;
-		$checksum = unpack('n', $checksum);
-
-		# FIXME: compare with the checksum!  how?  the data is
-		# gone into the Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum
-
-		$key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus,
-								    $exponent,
-								    $d,
-								    $p,
-								    $q);
-
-		$key->check_key() or die "Secret key is not a valid RSA key.\n";
-	      } else {
-		print(STDERR "We cannot handle encrypted secret keys.  Skipping!\n") ;
-		read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
-	      }
-	    }
-	  }
-
-	}
-      }
+    if (defined $subs->{$tag}) {
+      $subs->{$tag}($data, $instr, $tag, $packetlen);
     } else {
       read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen) or die "Could not skip past this packet!\n";
     }
   }
 
-  return $key;
+  return $data->{key};
 }
 
 
@@ -764,7 +952,6 @@ for (basename($0)) {
     # FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
     # hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
 
-
     if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY}) {
       $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key($ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY});
     } else {
@@ -778,7 +965,8 @@ for (basename($0)) {
 
     print pem2openpgp($rsa,
 		      $uid,
-		      { timestamp => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP},
+		      { sig_timestamp => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP},
+			key_timestamp => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_KEY_TIMESTAMP},
 			expiration => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_EXPIRATION},
 			usage_flags => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS},
 		      }
@@ -789,7 +977,7 @@ for (basename($0)) {
       my $instream;
       open($instream,'-');
       binmode($instream, ":bytes");
-      my $key = openpgp2ssh($instream, $fpr);
+      my $key = openpgp2rsa($instream, $fpr);
       if (defined($key)) {
 	if ($key->is_private()) {
 	  print $key->get_private_key_string();
@@ -800,6 +988,17 @@ for (basename($0)) {
 	die "No matching key found.\n";
       }
   }
+  elsif (/^revokeuserid$/) {
+    my $fpr = shift;
+    my $uid = shift;
+    my $instream;
+    open($instream,'-');
+    binmode($instream, ":bytes");
+
+    my $revcert = revokeuserid($instream, $fpr, $uid);
+
+    print $revcert;
+  }
   else {
     die "Unrecognized keytrans call.\n";
   }