are tracked via GnuPG, and managed in the known\_hosts and
authorized\_keys files used by OpenSSH for connection authentication.
-[[bugs]] | [[download]] | [[news]] | [[documentation|doc]]
+[[bugs]] | [[download]] | [[news]] | [[documentation|doc]] |
+[[development|dev]]
## Conceptual overview ##
Everyone who has used secure shell is familiar with the prompt given
-the first time you login, asking if you want to trust the server's
-fingerprint. In addition, many of us take advantage of OpenSSH's
-ability to use RSA or DSA keys for authenticating to a server, rather
-than relying on a password exchange.
-
-[OpenSSH](http://openssh.com/) already provides a functional way for
-managing the RSA and DSA keys required for these
-interactions. However, it lacks any type of [Public Key Infrastructure
-(PKI)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Key_Infrastructure).
+the first time you log in to a new server, asking if you want to trust
+the server's key by verifying the key fingerprint. Unfortunately,
+unless you have access to the server's key fingerprint through a
+secure out-of-band channel, there is no way to verify that the
+fingerprint you are presented with is in fact that of the server your
+really trying to connect to.
+
+Many users also take advantage of OpenSSH's ability to use RSA or DSA
+keys for authenticating to a server (known as "PubkeyAuthentication"),
+rather than relying on a password exchange. But again, the public
+part of the key needs to be transmitted to the server through a secure
+out-of-band channel (usually via a separate password-based SSH
+connection) in order for this type of authentication to work
+
+[OpenSSH](http://openssh.com/) currently provides a functional way to
+managing the RSA and DSA keys required for these interactions through
+the known\_hosts and authorized\_keys files. However, it lacks any
+type of [Public Key Infrastructure
+(PKI)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Key_Infrastructure) that
+can verify that the keys being used really are the one required or
+expected.
The basic idea of the Monkeysphere is to create a framework that uses
[GnuPG](http://www.gnupg.org/)'s keyring manipulation capabilities and
public keyserver communication to manage the keys that OpenSSH uses
for connection authentication.
+The Monkeysphere therefore provides an effective PKI for OpenSSH,
+including the possibility for key transitions, transitive
+identifications, revocations, and expirations. It also actively
+invites broader participation in the
+[OpenPGP](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Openpgp) [web of
+trust](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust).
+
+## Technical details ##
+
Under the Monkeysphere, both parties to an OpenSSH connection (client
and server) explicitly designate who they trust to certify the
identity of the other party. These trust designations are explicitly
use raw RSA public keys), and no modification is needed to the OpenSSH
software.
-To emphasize: *no SSH modification is required to use the
-Monkeysphere*.
-
-This offers users of OpenSSH an effective PKI, including the
-possibility for key transitions, transitive identifications,
-revocations, and expirations. It also actively invites broader
-participation in the [OpenPGP](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Openpgp)
-[web of trust](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust).
+To emphasize: *no modifications to SSH are required to use the
+Monkeysphere*. OpenSSH can be used as is; completely unpatched and
+"out of the box".
## Philosophy ##
Humans (and
[monkeys](http://www.scottmccloud.com/comics/mi/mi-17/mi-17.html))
-have innate capacity to keep track of the identity of a finite number
-of people. After our social sphere exceeds several dozen or several
-hundred (depending on the individual), our ability to remember and
-distinguish people begins to break down. In other words, at a certain
-point, we can't know for sure that the person we ran into in the
-produce aisle really is the same person who we met at the party last
-week.
+have the innate capacity to keep track of the identities of only a
+finite number of people. After our social sphere exceeds several dozen
+or several hundred (depending on the individual), our ability to
+remember and distinguish people begins to break down. In other words,
+at a certain point, we can't know for sure that the person we ran into
+in the produce aisle really is the same person who we met at the party
+last week.
For most of us, this limitation has not posed much of a problem in our
daily, off-line lives. With the Internet, however, we have an ability
of trust allows people who have never met in person to communicate
with a reasonable degree of certainty that they are who they say they
are. It works like this: Person A trusts Person B. Person B verifies
-Person C's identity. Then, Person A can verify Person C's identity.
+Person C's identity. Then, Person A can verify Person C's identity
+because of their trust of Person B.
The Monkeyshpere's broader goals are to extend the use of OpenPGP from
email communications to other activities, such as:
* [OpenSSH](http://openssh.com/)
* [GnuPG](http://www.gnupg.org/)
+* [Secure Shell Authentication Protocol RFC 4252](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4252)
* [OpenPGP RFC 4880](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880)
-* [URI scheme for SSH, RFC draft](http://tools.ietf.org/wg/secsh/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri/)
-
----
projects / monkeysphere.git / commitdiff