From 71afa5c8ef69365ee7db26d865f277f053198739 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 23:27:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] pem2openpgp: reorganization, cleanup of comments, adding a warning about secret material on stdout --- src/keytrans/pem2openpgp | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp index 4cc6f1d..3d9f6f8 100755 --- a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp +++ b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp @@ -1,8 +1,12 @@ #!/usr/bin/perl -w -T # pem2openpgp: take a PEM-encoded RSA private-key on standard input, a -# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP certificate -# from it. +# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP secret key +# and certificate from it. + +# WARNING: the secret key material *will* appear on stdout (albeit in +# OpenPGP form) -- if you redirect stdout to a file, make sure the +# permissions on that file are appropriately locked down! # Usage: @@ -160,6 +164,58 @@ my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80 # produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well. +########### Math/Utility Functions ############## + + +# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880 +sub simple_checksum { + my $bytes = shift; + + return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536; +} + +# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's +# extended algorithm. For more information see: +# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the +# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects. $a should +# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be +# coprime. + +sub modular_multi_inverse { + my $a = shift; + my $b = shift; + + my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new(); + my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero(); + my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one(); + my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one(); + my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero(); + + while (! $b->is_zero()) { + my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx); + + $a = $b; + $b = $remainder; + + my $temp = $x; + $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx)); + $lastx = $temp; + + $temp = $y; + $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx)); + $lasty = $temp; + } + + if (!$a->is_one()) { + die "did this math wrong.\n"; + } + + return $lastx; +} + + +############ OpenPGP formatting functions ############ + # make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body. # old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2) sub make_packet { @@ -210,13 +266,6 @@ sub mpi_pack { return pack('n', $mpilen).$val; } -# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880 -sub simple_checksum { - my $bytes = shift; - - return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536; -} - # FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys: sub make_rsa_pub_key_body { my $key = shift; @@ -231,45 +280,6 @@ sub make_rsa_pub_key_body { mpi_pack($e); } -# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's -# extended algorithm. For more information see: -# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the -# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects. $a should -# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be -# coprime. - -sub modular_multi_inverse { - my $a = shift; - my $b = shift; - - my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new(); - my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero(); - my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one(); - my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one(); - my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero(); - - while (! $b->is_zero()) { - my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx); - - $a = $b; - $b = $remainder; - - my $temp = $x; - $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx)); - $lastx = $temp; - - $temp = $y; - $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx)); - $lasty = $temp; - } - - if (!$a->is_one()) { - die "did this math wrong.\n"; - } - - return $lastx; -} - sub make_rsa_sec_key_body { my $key = shift; my $timestamp = shift; @@ -336,23 +346,28 @@ my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1}); # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run -# this script more than once against the same key. How can we prevent -# this? +# this script more than once against the same key (because the +# timestamps will differ). How can we prevent this? -# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time? +# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time, to +# be able to create a standard key? If we read the key from a file +# instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file? my $timestamp = time(); my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp); # FIXME: HARDCODED: what if someone wants to select a different set of -# usage flags? For now, we do only authentication. +# usage flags? For now, we do only authentication because that's what +# monkeysphere needs. my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $usage_flags->{authenticate}); # FIXME: HARDCODED: how should we determine how far off to set the # expiration date? default is to expire in 2 days, which is insanely -# short (but good for testing). +# short (but good for testing). The user ought to be able to decide +# this directly, rather than having to do "monkeysphere-server +# extend-key". my $expires_in = 86400*2; my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in); -- 2.25.1