+Each host that uses the \fBMonkeysphere\fP to authenticate its remote
+users needs some way to determine that those users are who they claim
+to be. SSH permits key-based authentication, but we want instead to
+bind authenticators to human-comprehensible user identities. This
+switch from raw keys to User IDs makes it possible for administrators
+to see intuitively who has access to an account, and it also enables
+end users to transition keys (and revoke compromised ones)
+automatically across all \fBMonkeysphere\fP-enabled hosts. The User
+IDs and certifications that the \fBMonkeysphere\fP relies on are found
+in the OpenPGP Web of Trust.
+
+However, in order to establish this binding, each host must know whose
+cerifications to trust. Someone who a host trusts to certify User
+Identities is called an Identity Certifier. A host must have at least
+one Identity Certifier in order to bind User IDs to keys. Commonly,
+every ID Certifier would be trusted by the host to fully identify any
+User ID, but more nuanced approaches are possible as well. For
+example, a given host could specify a dozen ID certifiers, but assign
+them all "marginal" trust. Then any given User ID would need to be
+certified in the OpenPGP Web of Trust by at least three of those
+certifiers.
+
+It is also possible to limit the scope of trust for a given ID
+Certifier to a particular domain. That is, a host can be configured
+to fully (or marginally) trust a particular ID Certifier only when
+they certify identities within, say, example.org (based on the e-mail
+address in the User ID).
projects / monkeysphere.git / blobdiff