and how the monkeysphere can help you reduce these threat vectors:
threat model reduction diagrams.
-Determine how openssh handles multiple processes writing to
- known_hosts/authorized_keys files (lockfile, atomic appends?)
-
Handle unverified monkeysphere hosts in such a way that they're not
always removed from known_hosts file. Ask user to lsign the host
key?
doc/george/host-key-publication for what dkg went through on
2008-06-19
-Streamline authorized_user_ids setup (including question of where
- authorized_user_ids files should go). See
- doc/george/user-id-configuration for what dkg went through on
- 2008-06-19
-
Ensure that authorized_user_ids are under as tight control as ssh
expects from authorized_keys: we don't want monkeysphere to be a
weak link in the filesystem.
+Consider the default permissions for
+ /var/lib/monkeysphere/authorized_keys/* (and indeed the whole
+ directory path leading up to that)
+
Make sure alternate ports are handled for known_hosts.
Script to import private key into ssh agent.
Update monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand man page with new keyserver
checking policy info.
-Update monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand man page with info about
- no-connect option.
+File bug against seahorse about how, when creating new primary keys,
+ it presents option for "RSA (sign only)" but then creates an "esca"
+ key.
+
+File bug against enigmail about lack of ability to create subkeys.
+
+Privilege separation: monkeysphere user to handle authn keyring and
+ generate authorized_keys file (which would be moved into place by
+ root). Host keyring would be owned by root.
+
+Test and document what happens when any filesystem that the
+ monkeysphere-server relies on and modifies (/tmp, /etc, and /var?)
+ fills up.
+
+Optimize keyserver access, particularly on monkeysphere-server
+ update-users -- is there a way to query the keyserver all in a
+ chunk?