## make sure all length() and substr() calls use bytes only:
use bytes;
-my $uid = shift;
-
-# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
-# hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
-
-
+my $old_format_packet_lengths = { one => 0,
+ two => 1,
+ four => 2,
+ indeterminate => 3,
+};
# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
my $a = shift;
my $b = shift;
+
+ my $origdivisor = $b->copy();
+
my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new();
my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+ my $finalquotient;
+ my $finalremainder;
+
while (! $b->is_zero()) {
my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx);
die "did this math wrong.\n";
}
- return $lastx;
+ # let's make sure that we return a positive value because RFC 4880,
+ # section 3.2 only allows unsigned values:
+
+ ($finalquotient, $finalremainder) = $lastx->add($origdivisor)->div($origdivisor, $ctx);
+
+ return $finalremainder;
}
sub make_packet {
my $type = shift;
my $body = shift;
+ my $options = shift;
my $len = length($body);
+ my $pseudolen = $len;
+
+ # if the caller wants to use at least N octets of packet length,
+ # pretend that we're using that many.
+ if (defined $options && defined $options->{'packet_length'}) {
+ $pseudolen = 2**($options->{'packet_length'} * 8) - 1;
+ }
+ if ($pseudolen < $len) {
+ $pseudolen = $len;
+ }
my $lenbytes;
my $lencode;
- if ($len < 2**8) {
- $lenbytes = 0;
+ if ($pseudolen < 2**8) {
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{one};
$lencode = 'C';
- } elsif ($len < 2**16) {
- $lenbytes = 1;
+ } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**16) {
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{two};
$lencode = 'n';
- } elsif ($len < 2**31) {
+ } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**31) {
## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal
## with potential overflow.
- $lenbytes = 2;
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{four};
$lencode = 'N';
} else {
## what the hell do we do here?
- $lenbytes = 3;
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{indeterminate};
$lencode = '';
}
# we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+ my $c3 = modular_multi_inverse($p, $q);
+
my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d).
mpi_pack($p).
mpi_pack($q).
- mpi_pack(modular_multi_inverse($p, $q));
+ mpi_pack($c3);
# according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, the closest value we can get out
# of get_key_parameters is 1/q mod p; but according to sec 5.5.3 of
return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
}
-# we're just not dealing with newline business right now. slurp in
-# the whole file.
-undef $/;
-my $buf = <STDIN>;
+# FIXME: handle DSA keys as well!
+sub pem2openpgp {
+ my $rsa = shift;
+ my $uid = shift;
+ my $args = shift;
-my $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($buf);
+ $rsa->use_sha1_hash();
-$rsa->use_sha1_hash();
+ # see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
+ # choice to use:
+ $rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
-# see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
-# choice to use:
-$rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
+ if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
+ die "key does not check";
+ }
-if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
- die "key does not check";
+ my $version = pack('C', 4);
+ # strong assertion of identity:
+ my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
+ # RSA
+ my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
+ # SHA1
+ my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
+
+ # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
+ # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
+ # this script more than once against the same key (because the
+ # timestamps will differ). How can we prevent this?
+
+ # this environment variable (if set) overrides the current time, to
+ # be able to create a standard key? If we read the key from a file
+ # instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
+ my $timestamp = 0;
+ if (defined $args->{timestamp}) {
+ $timestamp = ($args->{timestamp} + 0);
+ } else {
+ $timestamp = time();
+ }
+
+ my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
+
+
+ my $flags = 0;
+ if (! defined $args->{usage_flags}) {
+ $flags = $usage_flags->{certify};
+ } else {
+ my @ff = split(",", $args->{usage_flags});
+ foreach my $f (@ff) {
+ if (! defined $usage_flags->{$f}) {
+ die "No such flag $f";
+ }
+ $flags |= $usage_flags->{$f};
+ }
+ }
+
+ my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $flags);
+
+
+ # how should we determine how far off to set the expiration date?
+ # default is no expiration. Specify the timestamp in seconds from the
+ # key creation.
+ my $expiration_packet = '';
+ if (defined $args->{expiration}) {
+ my $expires_in = $args->{expiration} + 0;
+ $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
+ }
+
+
+ # prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
+ my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
+ $ciphers->{aes256},
+ $ciphers->{aes192},
+ $ciphers->{aes128},
+ $ciphers->{cast5},
+ $ciphers->{tripledes}
+ );
+
+ # prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
+ my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
+ $digests->{sha1},
+ $digests->{sha256},
+ $digests->{ripemd160}
+ );
+
+ # prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
+ my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
+ $zips->{zlib},
+ $zips->{bzip2},
+ $zips->{zip}
+ );
+
+ # we support the MDC feature:
+ my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
+ $features->{mdc});
+
+ # keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
+ my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
+ $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
+
+ my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
+ $creation_time_packet.
+ $usage_packet.
+ $expiration_packet.
+ $pref_sym_algos.
+ $pref_hash_algos.
+ $pref_zip_algos.
+ $feature_subpacket.
+ $keyserver_pref;
+
+ my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
+
+ my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
+ $version.
+ $sigtype.
+ $pubkey_algo.
+ $hash_algo.
+ $subpacket_octets.
+ $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
+
+ my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+ my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+
+ # this is for signing. it needs to be an old-style header with a
+ # 2-packet octet count.
+
+ my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey, {'packet_length'=>2});
+
+ # take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
+ my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
+
+ # the v4 signature trailer is:
+
+ # version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the
+ # signature data itself.
+ my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed));
+
+ my $uid_data =
+ pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)).
+ $uid;
+
+ my $datatosign =
+ $key_data.
+ $uid_data.
+ $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+ $trailer;
+
+ my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
+
+ my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
+
+ my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
+
+ my $sig_body =
+ $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+ pack('n', length($issuer_packet)).
+ $issuer_packet.
+ pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
+ mpi_pack($sig);
+
+ return
+ make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
}
-my $version = pack('C', 4);
-# strong assertion of identity:
-my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
-# RSA
-my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
-# SHA1
-my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
-
-# FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
-# certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
-# this script more than once against the same key (because the
-# timestamps will differ). How can we prevent this?
-
-# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time, to
-# be able to create a standard key? If we read the key from a file
-# instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
-my $timestamp = time();
-my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
-
-
-# FIXME: HARDCODED: what if someone wants to select a different set of
-# usage flags? For now, we do only authentication because that's what
-# monkeysphere needs.
-my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $usage_flags->{authenticate});
-
-
-# FIXME: HARDCODED: how should we determine how far off to set the
-# expiration date? default is to expire in 2 days, which is insanely
-# short (but good for testing). The user ought to be able to decide
-# this directly, rather than having to do "monkeysphere-server
-# extend-key".
-my $expires_in = 86400*2;
-my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
-
-
-# prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
-my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
- $ciphers->{aes256},
- $ciphers->{aes192},
- $ciphers->{aes128},
- $ciphers->{cast5},
- $ciphers->{tripledes}
- );
-
-# prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
-my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
- $digests->{sha1},
- $digests->{sha256},
- $digests->{ripemd160}
- );
-
-# prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
-my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
- $zips->{zlib},
- $zips->{bzip2},
- $zips->{zip}
- );
-
-# we support the MDC feature:
-my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
- $features->{mdc});
-
-# keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
-my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
- $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
-
-my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
- $creation_time_packet.
- $usage_packet.
- $expiration_packet.
- $pref_sym_algos.
- $pref_hash_algos.
- $pref_zip_algos.
- $feature_subpacket.
- $keyserver_pref;
-
-my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
-
-my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
- $version.
- $sigtype.
- $pubkey_algo.
- $hash_algo.
- $subpacket_octets.
- $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
-
-my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
-my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
-
-my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey);
-
-# take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
-my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
-
-# the v4 signature trailer is:
-
-# version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the
-# signature data itself.
-my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed));
-
-my $uid_data =
- pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)).
- $uid;
-
-my $datatosign =
- $key_data.
- $uid_data.
- $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
- $trailer;
-
-my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
+my $rsa;
+if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY}) {
+ $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key($ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY});
+} else {
+ # slurp in the entire stdin:
+ undef $/;
+ my $stdin = <STDIN>;
+ $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($stdin);
+}
-my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
-
-my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
+my $uid = shift;
-my $sig_body =
- $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
- pack('n', length($issuer_packet)).
- $issuer_packet.
- pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
- mpi_pack($sig);
-
-print
- make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
- make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
- make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
+# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
+# hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
+print pem2openpgp($rsa,
+ $uid,
+ { timestamp => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP},
+ expiration => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_EXPIRATION},
+ usage_flags => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS},
+ }
+ );
projects / monkeysphere.git / blobdiff