# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP certificate
# from it.
+# Usage:
+
+# pem2openpgp 'ssh://'$(hostname -f) < /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key | gpg --import
+
# Authors:
# Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
# Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
my $uid = shift;
-# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID.
+# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
+# hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
}
# FIXME: genericize this to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
-sub make_rsa_key_body {
+sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
my $key = shift;
my $timestamp = shift;
my $key = shift;
my $timestamp = shift;
- my $rsabody = make_rsa_key_body($key, $timestamp);
+ my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
- return Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
+ return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
}
-my $holdTerminator = $/;
+# FIXME: replace the opaque numbers below with
+# semantically-meaningful references based on these tables.
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
+my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
+ elgamal => 16,
+ dsa => 17,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.2
+my $ciphers = { plaintext => 0,
+ idea => 1,
+ tripledes => 2,
+ cast5 => 3,
+ blowfish => 4,
+ aes128 => 7,
+ aes192 => 8,
+ aes256 => 9,
+ twofish => 10,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.3
+my $zips = { uncompressed => 0,
+ zip => 1,
+ zlib => 2,
+ bzip2 => 3,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.4
+my $digests = { md5 => 1,
+ sha1 => 2,
+ ripemd160 => 3,
+ sha256 => 8,
+ sha384 => 9,
+ sha512 => 10,
+ sha224 => 11,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.21
+my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01,
+ sign => 0x02,
+ encrypt_comms => 0x04,
+ encrypt_storage => 0x08,
+ encrypt => 0x0c, ## both comms and storage
+ split => 0x10, # the private key is split via secret sharing
+ authenticate => 0x20,
+ shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 4.3
+my $packet_types = { pubkey_enc_session => 1,
+ sig => 2,
+ symkey_enc_session => 3,
+ onepass_sig => 4,
+ seckey => 5,
+ pubkey => 6,
+ sec_subkey => 7,
+ compressed_data => 8,
+ symenc_data => 9,
+ marker => 10,
+ literal => 11,
+ trust => 12,
+ uid => 13,
+ pub_subkey => 14,
+ uat => 17,
+ symenc_w_integrity => 18,
+ mdc => 19,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.1
+my $sig_types = { binary_doc => 0x00,
+ text_doc => 0x01,
+ standalone => 0x02,
+ generic_certification => 0x10,
+ persona_certification => 0x11,
+ casual_certification => 0x12,
+ positive_certification => 0x13,
+ subkey_binding => 0x18,
+ primary_key_binding => 0x19,
+ key_signature => 0x1f,
+ key_revocation => 0x20,
+ subkey_revocation => 0x28,
+ certification_revocation => 0x30,
+ timestamp => 0x40,
+ thirdparty => 0x50,
+ };
+
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.1
+my $subpacket_types = { sig_creation_time => 2,
+ sig_expiration_time => 3,
+ exportable => 4,
+ trust_sig => 5,
+ regex => 6,
+ revocable => 7,
+ key_expiration_time => 9,
+ preferred_cipher => 11,
+ revocation_key => 12,
+ issuer => 16,
+ notation => 20,
+ preferred_digest => 21,
+ preferred_compression => 22,
+ keyserver_prefs => 23,
+ preferred_keyserver => 24,
+ primary_uid => 25,
+ policy_uri => 26,
+ usage_flags => 27,
+ signers_uid => 28,
+ revocation_reason => 29,
+ features => 30,
+ signature_target => 31,
+ embedded_signature => 32,
+ };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.24)
+my $features = { mdc => 0x01
+ };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.17)
+my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80
+ };
+
+# we're just not dealing with newline business right now. slurp in
+# the whole file.
undef $/;
my $buf = <STDIN>;
my $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($buf);
$rsa->use_sha1_hash();
-$rsa->use_no_padding();
+
+# see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
+# choice to use:
+$rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
die "key does not check";
my $version = pack('C', 4);
# strong assertion of identity:
-my $sigtype = pack('C', 0x13);
+my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
# RSA
-my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', 1);
+my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
# SHA1
-my $hash_algo = pack('C', 2);
+my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
+# FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
+# certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
+# this script more than once against the same key. How can we prevent
+# this?
+# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time?
+my $timestamp = time();
-my $timestamp = 1231003584;
+my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
-my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, 2, $timestamp);
+# FIXME: HARDCODED: what if someone wants to select a different set of
+# usage flags? For now, we do only authentication.
+my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $usage_flags->{authenticate});
-# usage: signing and certification:
-my $flags = 0x03;
-my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, 27, $flags);
-
-# expire in 2 days:
+# FIXME: HARDCODED: how should we determine how far off to set the
+# expiration date? default is to expire in 2 days, which is insanely
+# short (but good for testing).
my $expires_in = 86400*2;
-my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, 9, $expires_in);
+my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
# prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
-my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, 11, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2);
+my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
+ $ciphers->{aes256},
+ $ciphers->{aes192},
+ $ciphers->{aes128},
+ $ciphers->{cast5},
+ $ciphers->{tripledes}
+ );
# prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
-my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, 21, 2, 8, 3);
+my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
+ $digests->{sha1},
+ $digests->{sha256},
+ $digests->{ripemd160}
+ );
# prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
-my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, 22, 2, 3, 1);
+my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
+ $zips->{zlib},
+ $zips->{bzip2},
+ $zips->{zip}
+ );
# we support the MDC feature:
-my $features = pack('CCC', 2, 30, 1);
+my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
+ $features->{mdc});
# keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
-my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, 23, 0x80);
+my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
+ $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
$creation_time_packet.
$pref_sym_algos.
$pref_hash_algos.
$pref_zip_algos.
- $features.
+ $feature_subpacket.
$keyserver_pref;
my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
$subpacket_octets.
$subpackets_to_be_hashed;
-my $pubkey = make_rsa_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
-#open(KEYFILE, "</home/wt215/gpg-test/key-data");
-my $key_data = make_packet(6, $pubkey);
+my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey);
-# take the last 16 characters of the fingerprint as the keyid:
-my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 40 - 16, 16);
+# take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
+my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
# the v4 signature trailer is:
my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
-my $issuer_packet = pack('CCH16', 9, 16, $keyid);
+my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
mpi_pack($sig);
-print make_packet(6, $pubkey);
-print make_packet(13, $uid);
-print make_packet(2, $sig_body);
+print
+ make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
+
-$/ = $holdTerminator;